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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT
COUNTY OF FRANKLIN
________________________________________________X
In the Matter of the Application of
BRYANT EVANS,#93-A-4410,
Petitioner,
for Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules

DECISION AND JUDGMENT
RJI #16-1-2009-0284.71
INDEX # 2009-0805
ORI #NY016015J

-against-

ANDREA EVANS, Chief Executive Officer,
NYS Division of Parole and Chairwoman,
NYS Board of Parole,
Respondent.
________________________________________________X
This is a proceeding for judgment pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR that was
originated by the Petition of Bryant Evans, verified on June 5, 2009, and filed in the
Franklin County Clerk’s office on June 12, 2009. Petitioner, who is now an inmate at
the Oneida Correctional Facility, is challenging the January, 2009, determination
denying him parole and directing he be held for an additional 24 months. The Court
issued an Order to Show Cause on June 18, 2009, and had received and reviewed
respondent’s Answer, including Confidential Exhibits B and D, verified on July 29,
2009, supported by the Affirmation of Kelly L. Munkwitz, Esq., Assistant Attorney
General, dated July 29, 2009. The Court has also received and reviewed petitioner’s
Reply thereto and Memorandum of Law, both filed in the Franklin County Clerk’s office
on August 13, 2009.
On May 20, 1993, petitioner was sentenced in Supreme Court, New York County,
to consecutive indeterminate sentences of 8a to 25 years and 2a to 7 years upon his
convictions of the crimes of Manslaughter 1° and Criminal Possession of a Weapon 3°.
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At that time a concurrent indeterminate sentence of 5 to 15 years was also imposed upon
petitioner’s conviction of the crime of Criminal Possession of a Weapon 2°. After having
been denied discretionary parole release on four previous occasions petitioner appeared
before a three-member Parole Board at the Bare Hill Correctional Facility, via
teleconference, on January 6, 2009. Following the interview petitioner was again
denied parole release and it was directed that he be held in DOCS custody for an
additional 24 months. The parole denial determination reads as follows:
“AFTER A CAREFUL REVIEW OF YOU RECORD, A
PERSONAL INTERVIEW, AND DELIBERATION, PAROLE
IS DENIED. THIS PANEL REMAINS CONCERNED
ABOUT THE SERIOUS NATURE OF THE INSTANT
OFFENSE OF MANSLAUGHTER 1ST, CPW 2ND AND CPW
3RD SERVING AN AGGREGATED TERM OF 10¾ [should
be 10b] TO 32 YEARS. IN 1992, YOU, ARMED WITH A
9 MM HANDGUN, SHOT AND KILLED A MALE VICTIM.
YOUR INSTITUTIONAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND
RELEASE PLANS ARE NOTED. YOU HAVE RECEIVED 2
TIER II INFRACTIONS SINCE YOUR LAST PAROLE
BOARD APPEARANCE; THEREFORE, WHEN
CONSIDERED WITH OTHER REQUIRED AND
RELEVANT FACTORS LEADS TO THE CONCLUSION
THAT YOUR DISCRETIONARY RELEASE AT THIS TIME
IS INAPPROPRIATE.
IF RELEASED AT THIS TIME, THERE IS A REASONABLE
PROBABILITY THAT YOU WOULD NOT LIVE AND
REMAIN AT LIBERTY WITHOUT VIOLATING THE LAW.
YOUR RELEASE AT THIS TIME IS INCOMPATIBLE
WITH THE WELFARE AND SAFETY OF THE
COMMUNITY.”
The document perfecting petitioner’s administrative appeal was received by the Division
of Parole Appeals Unit on January 20, 2009. The Appeals Unit , however, failed to
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issued its findings and recommendations within the time prescribed in 9 NYCRR
§8006.4(c) . This proceeding ensued.
Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A) provides, in relevant part, as follows:
“Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as a reward for good
conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there
is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at
liberty without violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the
welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine
respect for law. In making the parole release decision, the guidelines adopted pursuant
to subdivision four of section two hundred fifty-nine-c of this article shall require that
the following be considered: (I) the institutional record including program goals and
accomplishments, academic achievements, vocational education, training or work
assignments, therapy and interpersonal relationships with staff and inmates . . .(iii)
release plans including community resources, employment, education and training and
support services available to the inmate; [and ] (iv) any deportation order issued by the
federal government against the inmate while in the custody of the department of
correctional services . . .” In addition to the above, where the minimum period of
imprisonment was established by the sentencing court, the Board must also consider the
seriousness of the underlying offense and the inmate’s prior criminal record. See
Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A) and §259-i(1)(a).
Discretionary parole release determinations are statutorily deemed to be judicial
functions which are not reviewable if done in accordance with law (Executive Law §259i(5)) unless there has been a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety. See
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Silmon v. Travis, 95 NY2d 470, Vasquez v. Dennison, 28 AD3d 908, Webb v. Travis,
26 AD3d 614 and Coombs v. New York State Division of Parole, 25 AD3d 1051. Unless
the petitioner makes a “convincing demonstration to the contrary” the Court must
presume that the New York State Board of Parole acted properly in accordance with
statutory requirements. See Nankervis v. Dennison, 30 AD3d 521, Zane v. New York
State Division of Parole, 231 AD2d 848 and Mc Lain v. Division of Parole, 204 AD2d
456.
The Court initially finds that the failure of the respondent to make a timely
determination with respect to petitioner’s administrative appeal did not serve to
invalidate the underlying parole denial determination. Such failure only entitled
petitioner to deem his administrative remedies exhausted and seek judicial review of the
denial determination with the respondent barred from asserting an exhaustion defense.
See 9 NYCRR §8006.4(c). See also Graham v. New York State Division of Parole, 269
AD2d 628, lv den 95 NY2d 753 and People ex rel Tyler v. Travis, 269 AD2d 636.
The main focus of the petition centers around the assertion that the Parole Board
failed to give adequate consideration to petitioner’s rehabilitative achievements and
community support. According to petitioner, the Board simply “glossed over”these
matters and improperly based the parole denial determination exclusively on the
seriousness of the offense underlying his incarceration and two minor disciplinary
infractions incurred since his last Board appearance.
The record before the Court reveals that petitioner’s Parole Board had before it,
and discussed, a variety of statutory factors other than the nature of the underlying
offense. During the course of the January 6, 2009, parole interview one of the
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commissioner’s noted that petitioner had completed all required programs and then
invited petitioner to discuss such programs. Petitioner responded as follows: “When I
first came to prison in ’93 I got my G.E.D. and then shortly after that I enrolled in
college program at Coxsackie-Russell Sage. After that I worked in industry, got my ART,
did a vocational, did everything, teachers aid [sic], everything.” A parole commissioner
also noted that petitioner only had two minor Tier II count violations since his last
Parole Board appearance. In addition, petitioner’s plans to live with his step father in
the Bronx, if released, was mentioned along with petitioner’s plans to continue his
college education at Bronx Community College. Finally, as the parole interview drew
to a close, petitioner was asked if there was “[a]nything else you want to put on the
record that we have not discussed here today?” Petitioner responded in the negative.
Respondent’s assertions to the contrary notwithstanding, the Court finds that the
Parole Board considered the appropriate statutory factors but opted to place emphasis,
as it was free to do, on the seriousness of the underlying criminal offense wherein
petitioner shot and killed a man during the course of a verbal altercation on the street.
A Parole Board need not assign equal weight to each statutory factor it is required to
consider in connection with a discretionary parole determination, nor is it required to
expressly discuss each of those factors in its written decision. See Martin v. New York
State Division of Parole, 47 AD3d 1152, Porter v. Dennison, 33 AD3d 1147 and Baez v.
Dennison, 25 AD3d 1052, lv den 6 NY3d 713.
In these circumstances there is no basis to conclude that the parole denial
determination was affected by irrationality bordering on impropriety. See Montalvo v.
New York State Board of Parole, 50 AD3d 1438, Cruz v. New York State Division of
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Parole, 39 AD3d 1060 and Thompson v. New York State Division of Parole, 30 AD3d
746, lv den 7 NY3d 716.
Based upon all of the above, it is, therefore, the Decision of the Court and it is
hereby
ADJUDGED, that the petition is dismissed.

Dated:

November 16, 2009, at
Indian Lake, New York.

__________________________
S. Peter Feldstein
Acting Supreme Court Justice
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